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AFGHANISTAN -THE SHIFT IN STRATEGY AFTER EIGHT YEARS
War is a matter of vital importance to the State; the province of life or death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied.
-Sun Tzu 1 "Prior to September 11, 2001 when Afghanistan was in the dark days of its selfdestruction, the international community had all ignored them". and in December 2001 respectively. 4 The objective was to crush Al-Qaeda and its ally the Taliban.
5
OEF started with the US led aerial bombing campaign towards the Taliban said to be supporting and harboring Al-Qaeda. By the end of 2001, the Taliban regime was removed and the Al-Qaeda network disrupted and dismantled. 6 However, despite the removal of the Taliban and the establishment of an Afghan government as well as billions of dollars in numerous assistance and humanitarian aid, the Taliban and AlQaeda remain a threat to the Afghans and the international community as a whole. As support for the government declines, support for the Taliban grows. This evidently explains why after eight years the US and ISAF are not winning the war, and the situation is "serious".
7
This study will begin by first examining the CDPP with emphasis on the strategic thinking process that led to the strategy adopted by the US and ISAF, followed by
The question is what happened, and what do we do?
examining the approach used during the rebuilding phase. Subsequently, this study will conclude with recommendations viewed as the way forward in addressing the situation in Afghanistan today. The approach used will then be analyzed against the application of the instruments of national power; namely diplomatic, information, military and economic (DIME) and its impact towards the US and ISAF efforts in winning the war.
To begin with, the situation today is described by Michael Boyle as a classic example of a strategic trap; "you can't win, you can't lose, and you can't get out", and the only hope to escape this trap (Afghanistan) demands a commitment to the costs that are required to achieve them. 8 The Campaign Design and Planning Process (CDPP) Some argued that, had the operation been conducted differently (meaning more troops and with effective political and social efforts), the current situation could have been different (better security, better economy, a better political and social environment with a stable government). Others, however, defended the operations as executed, but agree things have not gone according to plan.
Campaign Design is a commander-based methodology for applying strategic thinking to continuously understand the operational environment, frame-ill-structured problems, and develop relevant solutions to achieve a campaign's desired end state.
9
Campaign Planning is the process whereby the commander translates national or theatre strategy into operational concepts through the development of an operation plan for a campaign.
10
In this context, the whole process would have started with a CDPP especially the strategic thinking, a process that helps minimize blind spots and surprises when making decisions on strategic issues to enable long-term success. 11 Strategic thinking in this study is defined as; "the ability to integrate different perspectives about ambiguous, complex issues with respect to the past, present and future and to evaluate information and outcomes through critical, creative, systems, and ethical lenses." 12 This thinking process explicitly focused on self-awareness and how to think.
13
In simple words, the CDPP is indeed an important stage in designing and planning a campaign for which if not conducted or done thoroughly to include the impact towards the population and a well considered follow through rebuilding phase would lead to severe consequences. Or as Liddell Hart stated; "if you concentrate exclusively on victory, with no thought for the after effect, you may be too exhausted to profit by the peace, while it is almost certain that the peace will be a bad one, containing germs of another war". 14 In this regard, had the CDPP and strategic thought process been done thoroughly (with a follow through on the rebuilding phase), the situation today would have been different (with a more stable government and effective political and social development). One may argue that a rebuilding phase in Afghanistan has indeed been conducted over the past eight years. Nevertheless, this study observed that the process has not been successful in its entirety and has consequently led to declining support by the Afghans towards ISAF. Admiral Mullen's statement that; "the gap between promised improvements and actual developments harms the credibility of the US message.", provided the evidence of the situation today. 15 When OEF was first launched, the operation started with the US led aerial bombing campaign towards the Taliban. Secretary Rumsfeld pointed-out (on the day OEF was launched) that; "There are not a lot of value targets. The Taliban and AlQaeda do not have armies, navies and air forces…". 16 While he categorized the war as being notably different from others, the US approach, a conventional approach meant to be short and quick in tempo, low in casualties with strategic consequences, very much a Clausewitz's approach, was not different. As some individuals involved in the operation described; OEFrevitalized the American way of war. 17 However, by the third day of the air strikes, US planes returned back with their ordnance because they could not find obvious targets. 18 The ground operation was initially conducted by the Afghan Northern Alliance (the indigenous anti-Taliban forces) and later taken-over by the US, the British and the Canadian infantry as well as the US Special Forces. The attacks were conventional in nature; aimed at removing the Taliban from power. The Taliban were seen as the center of gravity-COG (as described by Clausewitz), 19 or Decisive Points-DPs (by Jomini). 20 By attacking the COG (or DPs), 21 Despite knowing that the Taliban do not have armies, OEF was launched with an overwhelming force very much superior to the Taliban. Although the operation was said to be a success, it did not last long nor did it capture or confirm the death of Osama bin Laden or the Taliban leader Muhammad Omar.
the US expected to eventually disrupt and dismantle
Taliban support to Al-Qaeda. 22 A similar situation happened before during the French invasions of Spain and Russia. During that campaign, according to Jomini; "it was literally pointless to mass forces, because there were no decisive points to attack: the enemy was everywhere, usually concealed behind a screen of popular hostility that blinded the invaders". 23 The above approach indeed broke the back of the Taliban and scattered much of Al-Qaeda into the mountains. 24 The success was, however, not long lasting and OEF has instead been dragged out for eight years and the theory of war adopted proven wrong.
The problems in Afghanistan today can greatly be attributed to the lack or failure of the US Intelligence agency. As revealed by Dennis Blair (Director of National Intelligence) the US lacks deep understanding of the local power structure and the militants operating along the border with Pakistan." 25 As a result, the US underestimated the capabilities of the Taliban and its network, the impact of the conventional approach towards the Afghan people and the effect of the geographical nature of the terrain in Afghanistan.
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Early on, the US should have recognized that the Taliban are not fighting a conventional battle. They are fighting an insurgency war, as insurgents, aimed at overthrowing the established government. 27 The US, however, has continued to approach the problem using conventional military strategy and it is this continued Afghanistan -USFOR-A and ISAF), believes that "success is achievable". 31 The result is a shift in focus from going after the Taliban to protecting the population. 32 Eventually,
McChrystal's call to stop bombing the Taliban and start protecting the civilians echoed by his view that; "the war will only come to an end with a political solution", provided the evidence to further substantiate the conventional approach of using overwhelming forces against the Taliban insurgents was wrong. 33 Sun Tzu once said; to disrupt the enemy, one needs to analyze their own interest as well as the enemy's. 34 He reiterated further that; "one who knows the enemy and knows himself will not be endangered in a hundred engagements". 35 In this regard, had the critical thinking process been thorough, the US would have considered the Taliban as insurgents, and according to many defense experts, insurgents would use the Vietnamese approach derived from Mao Zedong's teachings. 36 The Taliban has apparently been more successful in adopting Sun Tzu's approach by being 'everywhere and nowhere', a way of thinking that is alien to Western intellectual and cultural traditions. They appear to be; "so veiled and subtle, to the point of having no form; so mysterious and miraculous, to the point of making no sound, and they can be the arbiter of the enemy's fate".
This amplifies the need for the US and ISAF to understand Sun Tzu being the source of Mao's teachings in fighting the Taliban.
37
The Taliban appear to have adopted Sun Tzu's practices by attacking places the US and ISAF did not protect and holding places the US and ISAF is not expected to attack. They continue to modify their tactics in accordance to the changing US and ISAF situation.
Al-Qaeda remains a problem and after five years of conflict the Taliban have resurfaced, millions of dollars have been spent with little to show for it. Making matters worse, US intelligence remains in the dark over the command structure of the Taliban. 38 They survive the air attacks and raids, and have proven to be more aggressive, 39 justifying the need to change the tactics and strategy toward stabilizing the population in order to avoid further deterioration to the security situation in Afghanistan today.
The US and ISAF may have be winning the battles, but are they winning the war? The Taliban remain, as described by McChrystal, a very aggressive enemy. 40 The question is; could this be history again repeating itself as another Vietnam? 41 At this point, it appears that the more the US and ISAF wishes to impose a peace entirely of their own choosing, 'by conquest', the stiffer the obstacle will be along the path. environment. 43 In a COIN operation, the focus is not just about fighting the Taliban insurgents.
Instead, the focus of effort is winning the support of the Afghans. They are the COG (as rightly pointed-out by McChrystal) not the Taliban and Al-Qaeda as assumed during the initial stages of OEF. The will of the Afghans is the key to the US and ISAF's success.
This indirect approach of protecting the population as opposed to focusing on engaging the Taliban is meant to limit insurgent activities and separate the Afghan people from the Taliban. 44 The problem is, insurgents such as the Taliban live and survive among the population, they survive and control from within the people, not from the sidelines. 45 Most ordinary Afghans do not submit to the Taliban (or Al-Qaeda) out of sheer support of their ideology, but due to poverty and deprivation or fear for the safety of their families. They are even said to support the Taliban merely to feed their families. 46 In essence, during the CDPP, the US and ISAF should have considered Sun Tzu (and Liddell Hart) as a complement to Clausewitz (and Jomini), especially when operating in an unconventional war against unseen enemies (the Taliban). In this regard, the indirect approach as advocated by McChrystal should have been thought of all along. As COIN theory states, the side who wins over the local population first will likely emerge victorious.
Hence, the approach toward the war from the on-set should have been focused on protecting the Afghan people, winning their support, and segregating them from the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. 47 The least that should have been done is to understand Sun Tzu since the Taliban are evidently succeeding in using Sun Tzu to their advantage.
The ability of the Taliban to modify tactics that suit the changing situation has made it difficult for the US and ISAF to defeat them. This explains why McChrystal said; "the current strategy cannot win".
48
The Strategy
Strategy could be described as the relationship among ends, ways, and means.
'Ends' are the objectives, 'Means' are the resources available to pursue the objective, and 'Ways' would be the methods of how one organizes and applies resources. 49 In simple words, strategy is about the use (the way) of the capabilities (the means) available to achieve the objectives (the end networks and establishing credibility". 53 As for OEF, the US strategy was employing targeted and decisive force against the 'killers', to train the Afghans to defend their own nation and to help the Afghans build a just and democratic government. 54 The Taliban's priorities on the other hand are quite different (as highlighted earlier) from Al-Qaeda who are waging global terrorism.
This explains the military strategy of going after the Taliban adopted all along. The strategy, however, backfired as evident today. 55 Having separated the locals from the Taliban (as discussed earlier), the subsequent strategy should have been separating the Taliban from Al-Qaeda and to win them over using the indirect or 'soft approach' which would eventually disrupt and dismantle the Al-Qaeda network in
Afghanistan. 56 After all, the Taliban as described by Kissinger is a local (not a global)
threat, a negotiation with the group could eventually isolate Al-Qaeda. 57 With regard to Al-Qaeda, having isolated them from the Taliban, they should have been managed in a more holistic manner and the strategy executed in concert with the neighboring states such as Pakistan, where Al-Qaeda is currently said to be operating from. 58 Even Yemen, being Osama's ancestral homeland and the focus of the jihadist networks' activities, should not be ruled out. 59 It is noted though that it is much more difficult now to track down Al-Qaeda and eliminate their operations. For this reason, diplomatic efforts, especially with the bordering states as well as other states with potential to be safe havens to Al-Qaeda, should have been pursued at the same time with OEF in Afghanistan. 60 As Bilal once said; "the key to a more effective US strategy is to cultivate credibility through the community".
This amplifies the need to use the diplomatic or political component of national power over the military as the thrust in resolving the situation in Afghanistan and the global threat of Al-Qaeda. This would, however, require effective strategic communication by the US and ISAF especially in reaching the Afghan people. 61 In this regard, the problems are not about communications at all, but about the execution of policy. 62 Boone (Prof of Military History at US Army War College) once said; strategic communication is "80% actions and 20% words". 63 In this case, the US and ISAF actions do not appear to be aligned to their words. 64 What is being said does
not coincide with what they (the Afghans) see on the ground, and this explains why efforts to send positive messages about US military actions, especially the development efforts, instead hurt the US's credibility. 65 As Wajahat Ali pointed out; "our messages lack credibility because we haven't invested enough in building trust and relationships, and we haven't always delivered on promises". 66 All along the intial strategy adopted, as described by McChrystal, was the equivelant of a lumbering bull attacking a matador's cape, only to tire and eventually be defeated by a much weaker opponent. 67 This explains why McChrystal had to shift his focus toward the 'soft approach' in protecting the Afghans when he took command.
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A point to note however, is that it is significant that these efforts are seen to be led by Afghan leaders, rather than solely a US program. Subsequently, work towards improving the judicial system (to incorporate the tribal judicial system) along with the Afghan National Police (ANP), followed by the needed rebuilding programs to begin with at the village and district levels. In this situation, it is imperative that both the phases that are providing the stability and security (the military function) and the rebuilding phase (the nonmilitary function) of the Afghan people to move together. In other words, both the military and the civil agencies need to work together in a unified manner to win over the Afghans. As Mark Magnier once said; "whoever can bring security to Afghanistan will make a lot of people happy".
Using this approach, the focus shifted toward the Afghans as the COG (as opposed to the Taliban when OEF was first launched). Using this strategy, the main focus would be toward protecting the Afghan people, separating the Afghan people from the Taliban whilst at the same time expediting efforts in training the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The line-up apparently failed to perform, which led to the conflict today being viewed just as a continuation of decades of war involving almost the same players. The same situation happens in the south and east region whereby the failure of the antiTaliban leaders to demonstrate cohesiveness led to the Afghan commanders establishing their own authority. As a result, a culture of impunity was allowed to take root in the name of 'stability' with abusers free to return to their old ways. The situation evidently proved that; "a wolf remains a wolf". 74 Today, despite having established a central government, Afghanistan is still far from stable for various reasons. To start with, prior to the August 20, 2009 presidential election, the Karzai government was alleged of making deals with some of the country's notorious warlords. As a result, they are said to be just old fashioned Afghans cutting deals, and this culture is said to run directly to the presidential palace. Worse still, the judicial system itself is said to be corrupted, forcing locals to turn to the Taliban to resolve disputes. 75 The Afghan police, in the meantime, continue to be demanding bribes from vendors to continue selling their goods. 76 The US military contractors on the other hand are said to be paying suspected insurgents to protect the US's supply route. With this latest evidence, the Taliban not only earned additional respect, but worse, the US appeared to fund the very forces the US and ISAF are fighting.
As a result, ordinary Afghans weary of the prevailing lawlessness, chose to support the Taliban in stamping out such corruptions and restore the peace and allow trade to flourish again. The Taliban's refusal to deal with the warlords also earned them much respect. 77 Efforts by the warlords who control approximately 75% of Afghanistan's countryside said to continuously undercut the authority of the central government exacerbated the situation. 78 This utterly discredited the central government and the warlords whom the US and ISAF brought back after the Taliban's removal in 2001. The result is increased UN concern about the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan and especially in the Karzai government's ability to stamp out corruption. 79 As it stands today, despite being the recipient of billions of dollars, they (the central government) frequently scored domestic political points by blasting the US and UK for ignoring their demands. 80 For this reason, the US and ISAF may need to seriously reconsider their partnership and close cooperation with the central government. The situation as described by Boyle; "We can no longer pretend we are partnering with a government when it does not govern, or see itself as a partner". This further aggravates the situation and consequently contributes to why the Afghan people are turning their back on the efforts by the US and the UN. 83 Scattering and defeating the Taliban may have been relatively easy, but dealing with and unifying the Afghans is a much more difficult problem to solve. 84 As Kai Eide (the UN envoy to Afghanistan) stated; "there is a need to strengthen Afghan institutions at a local level and build a sustainable economy". 85 To stabalize Afghanistan, the central government needs to focus on improving the judicial and the secuirty system to include the ANSF and toward restarting the economic engine of growth, especially in attracting foreign investments into Afghanistan. This is important to ensure that all rebuilding efforts reach the Afghan people whilst at the same time to enable the central government to fund future development programs as well as their own security once the US and ISAF leave Afghanistan (projected to be July 2011). 86 These efforts will require tremendous commitment by the central government. A first step in this effort is President Karzai's willingness to talk with the Taliban leader Mullah Omar. 87 The Instrument of National Power All efforts in winning over the Afghans will require significant diplomatic/political and economic efforts and it is these efforts which will eventually decide the future of Afghanistan. The military component, will need to be used to assist in establishing a secure and stable environment. Effective strategic communication strategy should then follow to convey the good intention of the international community to the Afghan people.
According to Julian and Scott; "to succeed in the battle for the people's will, we must commit to attacking the problems within Afghanistan across all lines of operation, using the political, economic, social, informational, and military elements of our nations". 88 When viewed from the context in the employment of the instrument of national power (DIME), 89 the US and ISAF are evidently using the military component as the main thrust in a COIN operation, contrary to the Taliban who works toward winning the support of the population. In this respect, underestimating the Taliban not only led to the wrong theory of war and strategy being adopted, this also led to the wrong instrument of national power being used as the thrust in winning the war in Afghanistan. As a result, despite the technological superiority over the Taliban, the US and ISAF evidently failed in their approach and strategy as discussed earlier. The strategy backfired and severely hurt and injured the Afghan people.
Today, the Taliban have proven to be more aggressive with attacks on UN workers. 90 This has hampered UN efforts to carry out aid and development projects as well as work to revive local economies and improve local administration, an integral part of the COIN strategy. The situation has indeed made it even more difficult to win over the Afghans. 91 In fact, by mathematical logic, it is clear that the Taliban have the greater edge over US and ISAF because the ground advantage and the complex nature of the Afghan people works in their favor. 92 Nonetheless, McChrystal has said that; "success is achievable".
This has led to the perception that the US and ISAF have indeed been on the disadvantage and losing the war. 93 Hence, whilst the US and ISAF work towards stabilizing the security situation and training the ANSF, there remains questions regarding the impetus on diplomatic and political efforts.
Domestically, greater emphasis should be given to talking to the Taliban and the tribal leaderships. President Karzai had previously offered to talk with the Taliban but was opposed by the US administration. 94 In the global context, Afghanistan has been the crossroad, the trail of trade (Silk Road) and the key to peace and stability through economic and growth developments in this region.
With the recent development as announced by President Obama on Afghanistan, this approach should be given greater momentum. 95 In this respect, diplomatic efforts need to improve to actively engage states The US strategy for OEF was indeed clear. However, the lack of depth in the CDPP especially the strategic thought process that led to total reliance on Clausewitz's (and Jomini) approach towards the Taliban in a COIN operation. This strategy goes against what Kenneth Coon and Glenn Harned once said, that; when our adversaries are unconventional, so should be our approach to defeat them. 96 The Taliban, on the other hand, evidently adopted Sun Tzu, and they have shown more success. Taking a more indirect approach, as suggested by McChrystal, and focusing on the Afghans is a step in the right direction. The impact of the military strategy in adopting the 'hard approach' toward the Afghan people has been severe.
As result, the US approach has so far been unsuccessful. 97 In the meantime, Kenneth and Glenn also said that; fighting against extremism and insurgency cannot be won by using military alone. There is indeed a need to blend the diplomatic or political, informational, and economic components of national power.
For that reason, the US and ISAF need to refocus efforts on strategic communication in order to redevelop US and ISAF credibility. Communication alone, however, is not sufficient, actions must support those communications. To protect the Afghans across Afghanistan requires additional troops, which is only achievable in its entirety provided the US and ISAF are able to reach the actual numbers required. However, with the additional 30,000 troops announced recently, the US and ISAF should focus to provide stability and a secure environment, in order to protect the people and to train the ANSF at all levels especially at the village and district levels. The UN should then assist and push the central government in moving their economic engine of growth to enable them to generate their own revenue to fund for their future rebuilding programs and funding their own security. At this stage, the Afghans must be seen to take the lead in all efforts. These efforts, especially in providing Afghanistan a viable economy, will however, require decades, not years. 99 To defeat the Taliban which would eventually deny Al-Qaeda a safe haven, would require the support of a strong and stable Afghan government. To have a strong central government, the regime needs to be one the Afghan people are comfortable with. Despite billions of dollars, which have poured into Afghanistan since 2001, the condition of the Afghan people is still bad, and so is the plight of women -since the overthrow of the Taliban. 100 As highlighted earlier, cases of rule of law are being managed by the Taliban instead of the central government, which is attributing to the weak and unstable Afghan government. 101 These problems may require the US to reconsider its partnership with the Afghan central government. The US may need to change its role from partner to neutral mediator in order to be effective in assisting the Afghans. As partners, the Afghans expect and rely on the US to take the lead and bear joint responsibility in developing Afghanistan. At this juncture, the Afghans must be made to take the lead in all programs, inclusive of providing the local security at the lower levels as well as training the ANSF. With this approach, any delays or failures will be on them -the central governement. The central government has now been given until July 2011 to prove their commitment. Should they fail, the US could disengage from the situation in Afghanistan.
Gorbachov took a similar approach back in 1985. He gave one year to the Afghan leaders to make decisive progress. When they failed, in November 1986, the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan. 102 An identical situation happened before in Somalia back in 1995. With increasing loss of lives and costs to sustain the operation, when both factions (Ali Mahadi and Farah Aidid) failed to reconcile, the US, and eventually the UN, finally disengaged and withdrew from Somalia. 103 
Summary
The ball is now with the Afghans.
To summarize, after the Taliban government was removed, many Afghans hoped that the situation would guarantee their security and improve their economic and living conditions. The situation in Afghanistan today remains uncertain. OEF has not been succesful, greatly attributed to the failure right from the CDPP, especially the strategic thought process, followed by the wrong theories of war and strategy adopted and eventually the sole use of focusing primarily on the military as the thrust in winning the war in Afghanistan.
The lack of commitment, as evident from the shifting focus by the US to Iraq beginning in 2002, poor governance and endemic corruption are the key issues that led to the Afghan people to turn to the Taliban, has contributed to the continued skepticism towards the central government, the US and ISAF. This explains why after eight years the US and ISAF is not winning the war, and the Taliban instead is gaining the upper hand with increased activities. 104 Today, the stakes are numerous. The most important player is the ordinary Afghans who's daily life has been affected by almost thirty years of conflict, and who's security situation continues to be under constant threat. This insecurity prevents development from happening, which in turn reinforces insecurity and increasingly pushes Afghanistan in a downward and dangerous spiral. At the very least, the US and ISAF owe the Afghan people assurance that Afghanistan survives without collapsing into civil war or becoming a safe haven for terrorists. This will require concerted efforts domestically and internationally, especially along the bordering states of Afghanistan.
The US strategy today (as announced by McChrystal) is clear and that is "protecting the population".
. 105 With the eighteen months provided (until July 2011), while the US and ISAF work toward stabilizing the security situation and training the ANSF, the UN needs to be more aggressive in pushing and assisting the central government in improving the judicial system (without ignoring the tribal system) and the nations rebuilding programs.
At the same time, the UN need to push them (the central government) towards moving the economic engine of growth which would eventually generate self-funding to fund future projects and most important to pay for their own security. In this aspect, such rebuilding efforts remain substantially civilian. 106 What do we do?
To win over the Afghans and succeed in Afghanistan, the initial effort needs to focus on providing continuous protection to the people and in separating them from the Taliban. The Afghans need honest and trustworthy leadership from amongst them with a transparent and efficient armed police and judicial system. In addition, efforts need to be made to offer the low and middle level Taliban insurgents amnesty and an opportunity to rejoin society.
As for the rebuilding phase, there is a need to be selective and begin from the With the new strategy and time frame provided, greater impetus is required, especially in moving their economic engine of growth to fund future development projects and security.
To continuously disrupt the Al-Qaeda network internationally, diplomatic efforts with states of great potential as safe havens (especially the bordering states), must be given greater emphasis. Liddell Hart once said; "Peace through a stalemate, based on a coincident recognition by each side of the opponent's strength, is at least preferable to peace through common exhaustion-and has often provided a better foundation for lasting peace". 107 In other words, "we can pull a horse to the water, but it is up to the horse to drink or not…" In the end it will fall to the Afghans to make the decision on whether these efforts will be successful or not.
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